JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ABSTRACT: This study analyzes four mediation initiatives in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to understand the differences between mediators' capabilities and their effect on the negotiating flexibility of the disputing parties. It is claimed that regardless of the outcomes of the negotiations, in all mediation cases, parties adopted flexible negotiating behavior in the form of making or offering concessions, agreements on rules and procedures, agreements on mutual solutions, and introducing new peace proposals. In all instances, the mediators played both the facilitator and manipulator roles. The difference between a mediation process leading to an agreement and one ending with a stalemate is found in the way and extent to which a mediator uses his or her leverage in playing the role of a manipulator.
This article concerns the U.S. and other mediation efforts in BosniaHerzegovina. It analyzes the U.S. mediation effort together with other mediation attempts-the EC/CSCE and the U.N./EC mediations-to understand differences in the capabilities of the respective mediators and their effect on the negotiating flexibility of conflicting parties. The Contact Group mediation effort, by the United Nations, EU, United States, and Russia, is not a subject of this study since it is still in progress. The separation of third party efforts into four exercises by different intermediaries serves as an analytical device to answer questions concerning how third parties contribute to negotiating flexibility. It does not necessarily reflect the conflicting parties' perception of the events.
The article first examines the roles of the mediators in their search for agreement between parties. A description of the roles of the mediators is followed by an analysis of the negotiation processes. The purpose of this second section is to show that the way and extent to which the mediator uses his or her leverage in playing the role of a manipulator affects the negotiations. In other words, this section indicates, first, that mediators who practice manipulative tactics during the negotiations produce flexibility in negotiation, while mediators who manipulate the conflict environment before the negotiations produce both flexibility and sustainable agreements.
Second, it indicates that mediators who have high capability to manipulate the conflict environment produce both flexibility and a sustainable agreement but that mediators whose manipulative capabilities are low are limited to producing flexibility but fail to produce agreements. In the second negotiating situation, problem-solving negotiation, parties perceive the complementary nature of the relationship and try to maximize their mutual gains by cooperating.3 In this negotiation situation, strategies such as creating viable options or agreeing on a mutual solution may be considered as attributes of flexible behavior. Consequently, in this framework, flexibility may be considered to be equivalent to cooperative negotiation behavior.
The intellectual task, then, requires drawing the conceptual line between concession making and cooperative negotiation behavior, on the one hand, and negotiating flexibility, on the other. Taking a third negotiating situation as an analytical unit can help to conceptualize negotiating flexibility. Treating negotiation as a hybrid process, involving the attributes of both positional and problem-solving negotiating situations, allows one to understand the difference between negotiating flexibility, on the one hand, and the concessionmaking processes of positional bargaining, and the cooperative behavior of problem-solving negotiations, on the other. In this hybrid framework, flexibility encompasses both concession-making strategies and cooperative behavior-such as creating This broad definition of negotiating flexibility is not, however, equivalent to the negotiation process itself.
The latter, in addition to the elements already mentioned, also encompasses competitive negotiation behavior, such as threats, commitments, and bluffs. Thus the Vance-Owen mediation effort failed to produce a sustainable agreement, although it included several examples of flexible negotiating behavior (see Table 1 ). effects of that manipulation, in the second, the structural change is concrete, certain, and, thus, more credible. Simple timing is not the only explanation for the differences between the two manipulative strategies. The extent to which leverage was used by the mediator to bring about major change in the structure of the dispute also appeared to be a factor in whether the negotiations yielded 
